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Colorado Surtax on Income from Oil Royalties
Appeal from a decision of the Director of Revenue of Colorado
asserting an income tax deficiency against a taxpayer.
The director assessed the deficiency for two per cent surtax upon
royalties derived by the taxpayer as the owner of mineral rights in real
property in Texas, Kansas, and New Mexico from which oil and gas
was produced by lessees under oil and gas leases customarily used in the
respective states, and upon revenues received under permits from the
United States, the taxpayer having acquired the rights of the permittee.
The taxpayer, with respect to the property covered by the permits,
entered into leases for developing the production of oil and gas from
the property.
The taxpayer contended that the royalties consisted of income from
tangible property, and that, under the decision in the case of City and
County of Denver vs. Tax Research Bureau, 101 Colo. 140, 71 Pac.
(2d) 809 (1937), was not subject to the surtax. Constitutional ques-
tions concerning the validity of the surtax provision in regard to the
income were also raised by the taxpayer.
HELD, that the income received under the government permits con-
stituted income from intangibles, and was subject to the surtax, but that
the income derived from the oil and gas produced from property, the
mineral rights to which were owned by the taxpayer, constituted income
from tangible property, and was not subject to the surtax.
No opinion was given upon the constitutional questions. Martins
v. Cruse, as Director of Revenue, Denver District Court, No. 36783,
Sackmann, J., decided June 11, 1943.
FREDERICK P. CRANSTON.
EDITOR'S NOTE: In the case of Marston v. Cruse, decided in the
District Court of El Paso County, July 6, 1943, the court found that
the income derived from certain oil, gas and mineral leases did not con-
stitute royalties, nor was it income derived from intangible property.
Therefore, it was not subject to the surtax provision of the Colorado
income tax law.
Comments on Real Estate Standards 34 and 35
The committee of the Denver Bar Association on title standards
in promulgating Standards Nos. 34 and 35 concerning the application
of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to probate on statutory
proceedings for determination of interests in real property and as for the
principal basis for its determination presents the following memorandum
prepared by Golding Fairfield of Denver:
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The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 and amend-
ments thereto (hereinafter referred to as the act) contemplates proceed-
ings in which "defendants" are designated and against whom a default
can be entered. Our special proceeding for "determination of interests"
does not provide for "defendants" in the ordinary sense of the word nor
is a default entered against any party in interest. The proceeding names
and establishes the heirs of the decedent but takes nothing away from
these heirs. The proceeding does in fact establish and confirm in these
heirs an interest in real property. They can only be deprived of this
interest by their own act. An heir may sell or transfer his interest in the
real property or he may keep it, just as he pleases. If he does sell or
transfer it he must freely and voluntarily execute a deed. No such estab-
lished heir needs the protection of the act, and it was not intended that
the act should apply to such cases.
Assume, however, that the Federal Act is broad enough to include
a special proceeding of this kind. Is any better title to the real estate
obtained by an attempted compliance with the act? We do not think
so. We think such a compliance unnecessary.
The statute requires that notice in the special proceeding be pub-
lished. The requirement is for the purpose of notifying any possible
unknown, unnamed heir. This unknown is the only person concerned
with any provision of the act. But, if the act does apply to a special
proceeding of this kind and there should exist an unnamed and unknown
heir, and if it should happen that this nameless unknown was in mili-
tary service at the time the decree and findings were entered, then his
interests could not be affected either by an attempted compliance with
the act or by no compliance. In either case, when he later obtained
knowledge of the proceeding and his identity became known, he would
have his right under the act to appear in court and have the proceeding
re-opened. In other words, every decree that has been entered or will be
entered since August 27, 1940, is subject to the remote possibility of
there being an unknown heir in military service. Nothing we can do
when such decree is taken can deprive this unknown of his rights.
It might be argued that a defendant in military service would have
less difficulty in re-opening a decree if the act had not been complied with
than if it had been complied with. We do not believe this, but the fact
remains that in either event such defendant would still have a right, a
right to submit his application and make his showing. If a title is to be
objected to as unmarketable because this right exists, the degree of diffi-
culty involved in asserting or establishing the right can have no bearing
on the question of marketability.
Subdivision 4 of Section 200 of the act provides: "that if any
judgment shall be rendered in a proceeding governed by the section
against any person in military service, such judgment may be opened
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upon application made by such person not later than 90 days after he
leaves the service, and he may be permitted to appear in the action and
defend the same provided it is shown that he has a meritorious or legal
defense."
This right to appear in the action exists in all cases where a judg-
ment is rendered irrespective of whether or not the act was taken into
consideration at the time the judgment was rendered or whether or not
an affidavit re military service was filed and an attorney appointed.
All such decrees being subject to this remote possibility of being re-
opened, we nevertheless affirm that marketability of title is not involved.
In other words, a title to real property based on such decree, properly
obtained under Colorado statutes, is a good and marketable title, be-
cause fundamentally any decree or judgment is good without compliance
with the act. It is only when it later appears that a defendant was in
military service that any question arises.
All title examinations are based on a series of presumptions. We
presume delivery, we presume identity of parties, we presume authentic
signatures. We presume that the record is a correct copy of the original.
We presume the truth of recitals in certain instruments. And when a
Colorado court enters a final decree making certain solemn findings of
fact, we presume that those findings are true. When a final decree is
entered naming and finding certain persons as heirs of a decedent we rely
on the findings of that decree. They are prima facie evidence and remain
conclusive until the contrary is shown. Under a decree obtained in the
special proceeding for determining interests the title to real estate remains
good and marketable until it is shown that there is in fact an unknown
heir in military service who has a meritorious claim. If the courts took
the position that such decrees were not conclusive, did not render a title
prima facie marketable, then in the event of a long war a community
could become so situated that it would have no real estate transactions
at all because of a universal objection to marketability.
Furthermore, said subdivision 4 of Section 200 provides: "that
to vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment because of any of the provi-
sions of the act shall not impair any right or title acquired by any bona
fide purchaser for value under such judgment." Consequently, the heirs
so determined in the special proceeding have the right any time to convey
to a bona fide purchaser and his rights under such conveyance can never
be impaired even though an unknown party in interest in the military
service later appears and actually sets the decree and findings of court
aside.
For these reasons we think it unnecessary to attempt to apply the
provisions of the act in a proceeding to determine interests. It was not
done in the other war and for the most part attorneys are not doing it
now. No rule of any local court requires it.
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The Colorado supreme court library has received a bibliography on
current tax problems, in mimeographed pamphlet form, prepared in the
United States treasury department jointly by the office of the general
counsel, office of the tax legislative counsel and the division of tax
research.
The letter of transmittal states that no attempt has been made to
present an exhaustive bibliography on taxation. Instead, the purpose
has been to indicate readily available sources for one desiring an intro-
duction to some of the current tax issues. The scope is limited to federal
tax problems. No reference has been made to exclusively state and local
taxes or to federal-state-local tax relationships.
Attorney General Waives Certain Transfer
Requirements
The attorney general has waived certain requirements of Section 46,
Chapter 85, 1935 C: S. A., calling for a release before transferring assets
of decedents. Where the value of the asset sold or delivered to the person
entitled thereto does not exceed $200.00 in value, no notice need be first
given to the inheritance tax department nor written consent of the attor-
ney general obtained before effecting the transfer. The waiver specifically
applies to stocks, bonds, notes, mortgages, dividends, interest, bank
accounts, certificates of deposit, building and loan accounts or certificates,
and wages or salaries; but has no application to contents of safe deposit
boxes, insurance, annuities, or real estate.
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